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# Security and Maintenance of Montana Election Systems

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# Multiple Risks Exist in Elections

Election Security

- Evaluating Physical Security
- Managing Election Security Risks and Resources

Reviewed...  
Security assessments and election security posture at the counties and responsibilities managing election security

2018-2020 HAVA funding and expenditures and the use of resources

Election Integrity

- Data Accuracy
- Timely Updates

Maintenance and integrity over voter registration information

# Summary

## Define Security

- Evolution of IT and threats require continuous improvements to election security and accuracy. Proactive steps such as defining election security and responsibility will ensure that elections adapt and evolve as threats do.

## Improve Resource Management

- SOS can also make improvements to grant management practices to ensure that resources are addressing high security risks at the state and local levels.

## State-Level Maintenance

- Finally, as SOS implements a new voter registration system, implementing state-level maintenance procedures will ensure voter registration reliability and integrity.

# Election Security Definitions

## National and Federal Industry Best Practices

Election Assistant Commission

Department of Homeland Security

Department of Defense

## Election Security Best Practices and Guidance

Election Vendor Guidance

Center for Internet Security

National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is most referenced security framework

## Election Physical Security

- ❖ Tabulators
- ❖ Printers
- ❖ Ballots
- ❖ USB Drives
- ❖ Computers

# Establish Election Security Definition and Oversight

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## Current Montana Law Needs Scope of Election Security Definitions

- Election Security Undefined

## County Risk Assessments Inconsistent

- Counties Did Not Consistently Meet Standards and Best Practices

# Election Security Recommendation #1

## § 13-1-202

**“...evaluate the security, accuracy, and accessibility of elections...”**

## § 13-17-211

**“...secure voting systems before, during, and after an election.”**

## §13-17-103

**“A voting system...is protected from tampering for fraudulent purpose...device meets electronic security standards...”**

We recommend the Montana Legislature:

A. Clearly define the scope of election security using federal election security best practices and NIST security controls to ensure all aspects of elections are secure and;

B. Mandate the assessment of election security using defined security standards at the local and state level.



# Establish Election Security Rule

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SOS Rule does not Align with Statute, Best Practices, or Standards

- Current Rule is Not Consistent with Statute
- Missing Detailed Information and Guidelines based on Election Security National Best Practices and Standards

# Election Security Recommendation #2

## ARM 44.3.1713

“...must comply with security measures necessary to secure the voting system before, during, and after an election...”

## ARM 44.3.1701

“...System...includes a self-contained mechanical voting machine or an electronic voting device and the individual components of each.”

“...Voting machine means a mechanical apparatus on which to cast votes.”

We recommend the Secretary of State develop rules that:

A. Define voting system consistent with statute.

B. Includes detailed security measures that align with statute, election best practices, NIST security controls, and federal recommendations.



# Election Security Recommendation #4

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## SOS Needs Independent Security Oversight

- Oversight and coordination over all areas of security is shared between several SOS staff
- Missing single security management position

We recommend the Secretary of State fill the current Information Security Manager Position

# HAVA Grant Objectives

# Detailed Grant Management Program is Needed

Replacing Voter Equipment

- \$2.15 million for new voter equipment

Facilitating Cybersecurity Training

Implementing Post Election Audit

Implementing Cybersecurity Best Practices

Generally improving election security

The legislature could consider developing expectations for future spending and creating an oversight body to ensure the management and tracking of HAVA funding is meeting those expectations.

Meeting Objectives

- 53 counties have not had security assessments completed
- 25 counties have not completed security awareness training

**SOS applies to Election Commission Assistant for HAVA dollars**

**Counties apply to SOS for HAVA sub grants**

# SOS Needs to Implement Voter Maintenance Follow-up

## Recommendation #5

- ❖ Regular Maintenance, Data Analysis, Communication, and Follow-up Schedule

Do Current Maintenance Procedures Work?

- SOS receives information and matches with voter information
- Counties review potential matches
  - *493 outstanding potential matches*

How long do updates take?

- Reviewed status changes since 2015
  - *Most changes within 30 days*
  - *14% were 90 days to 1 year*

Were ballots accepted from deceased voters?

- Matched 22,000 deceased people with voter information
  - Reviewed ballots accepted since 2010
    - *2 individuals identified*
  - Verified clerical and system errors and no invalid ballots where submitted

# **THANK YOU!**

**Montana Election  
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