

Security and Maintenance of Montana Election Systems

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Multiple Risks Exist in Elections

Election Security

- Evaluating Physical Security
- Managing Election Security Risks and Resources

Election Integrity

- Data Accuracy
- **Timely Updates**

Reviewed...

Security assessments and election security posture at the counties and responsibilities managing election security

2018-2020 <u>HAVA funding</u> and <u>expenditures</u> and the use of <u>resources</u>

Maintenance and integrity
over voter registration
information

Summary

Define Security

• Evolution of IT and threats require <u>continuous improvements</u> to election <u>security</u> and <u>accuracy</u>. Proactive steps such as <u>defining</u> election <u>security</u> and <u>responsibility</u> will ensure that elections <u>adapt</u> and <u>evolve</u> as threats do.

Improve Resource Management

• SOS can also make <u>improvements</u> to <u>grant management</u> practices to ensure that <u>resources</u> are addressing <u>high security risks</u> at the state and local levels.

State-Level Maintenance

 Finally, as SOS implements a new voter registration system, implementing state-level maintenance procedures will ensure voter registration reliability and integrity.

Election Security Definitions

National and Federal Industry Best Practices

Election Assistant
Commission

<u>Department of</u> <u>Homeland Security</u>

Department of Defense

Election Security Best Practices and Guidance

Election Vendor
Guidance

Center for Internet |
Security

National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is most referenced security framework

Election Physical Security

- **❖** Tabulators
- Printers
- **❖** Ballots
- USB Drives
- Computers

Establish Election Security Definition and Oversight

Current Montana Law Needs Scope of Election Security Definitions

Election Security Undefined

County Risk Assessments Inconsistent

Counties Did Not Consistently Meet Standards and Best Practices

Election Security Recommendation #1

§ 13-1-202
"...evaluate the security, accuracy, and accessibility of elections..."

§ 13-17-211
"...secure voting systems
before, during, and after an
election."

§13-17-103
"A voting system...is
protected from tampering
for fraudulent
purpose...device meets
electronic security
standards..."

We <u>recommend</u> the <u>Montana</u> <u>Legislature</u>:

A. Clearly <u>define the scope of</u> <u>election security</u> using federal election security best practices and NIST security controls to <u>ensure all aspects of elections</u> <u>are secure</u> and;

B. Mandate the assessment of election security using defined security standards at the local and state level.

Establish Election Security Rule

SOS Rule does not Align with Statute, Best Practices, or Standards

- Current Rule is Not Consistent with Statute
- Missing Detailed Information and Guidelines based on <u>Election</u> Security National Best Practices and Standards

Election Security Recommendation #2

ARM 44.3.1713

"...must comply with security measures necessary to secure the voting system before, during, and after an election..."

"...System...includes a self-contained mechanical voting machine or an electronic voting device and the individual components of each."
"...Voting machine means a mechanical apparatus on which to cast votes."

We <u>recommend</u> the <u>Secretary of</u>

<u>State develop rules</u> that:

A. <u>Define voting system</u> consistent with statute.

B. Includes detailed <u>security</u> <u>measures</u> that align with statute, election best practices, NIST security controls, and federal recommendations.

Election Security Recommendation #4


SOS Needs Independent Security Oversight

- Oversight and coordination over all areas of security is shared between several SOS staff
- Missing single security management position

We recommend the Secretary of State <u>fill</u> the current <u>Information Security Manager Position</u>

HAVA Grant Objectives

Detailed Grant Management Program is Needed



SOS applies to Election Commission Assistant for HAVA dollars

Counties apply to SOS for HAVA sub grants

SOS Needs to Implement Voter Maintenance Follow-up

Do Current Maintenance Procedures Work?

Recommendation #5

 Regular Maintenance, Data Analysis, Communication, and Follow-up Schedule

How long do updates take?

Were ballots accepted from deceased voters?

- ➤ <u>SOS</u> receives information and matches with voter information
- ➤ Counties review potential matches
 - 493 outstanding potential matches
- > Reviewed status changes since 2015
 - Most changes within 30 days
 - 14% were 90 days to 1 year
- > Matched 22,000 deceased people with voter information
- Reviewed ballots accepted since 2010
 - 2 individuals identified
- Verified clerical and system errors and no invalid ballots where submitted

THANKYOU!

Montana Election
Security and Maintenance

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